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Despite the seemingly simple language of the statute, the interpretation of
the home mortgage interest deduction has recently garnered much attention as
the Internal Revenue Service and the courts grappled with its application to unmarried co-owners of a residence. In determining whether the indebtedness limitations apply on a “per-residence” or “per-taxpayer” basis, the Internal Revenue Service, the Tax Court, and the Ninth Circuit have conducted in-depth
analysis of the language of the statute, the statute’s legislative history, implications of related tax provisions, social and policy concerns, and financial consequences, and have consulted almost every canon of statutory interpretation. This
Article examines the legislative history and evolution of the present qualified residence interest deduction and analyzes the differing interpretations of the indebtedness limitations and the ultimate effect of the differing interpretations on taxpayers with different marital status. Also examined is the Internal Revenue
Service’s surprising announcement that it will follow the Ninth Circuit’s holding
in Voss v. Commissioner that the indebtedness limitations apply separately to
each unmarried co-owner of a residence. This Article concludes with a discussion
of possible options for future legislation with regard to the qualified residence interest deduction, repealing or limiting the current deduction or replacing the deduction with a tax credit.
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INTRODUCTION
The marital status of an individual has long been an important consideration in tax planning.1 Depending on the relative income of individuals, the tax
laws may result in a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. Although in recent
years there has been interest in reducing marriage penalty, a decision by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”) has resulted in a substantial
marriage penalty in the application of one of the most popular deductions available to individuals. In Voss v. Commissioner, the issue was whether the home
mortgage interest deduction applies on a per-residence or a per-taxpayer basis.2
The Ninth Circuit held the indebtedness limitations apply separately to each coowner of a residence, thereby doubling the indebtedness limitations for unmarried co-owners.3
This Article discusses recent developments in the availability of the qualified residence interest deduction, with a focus on the interpretation of the indebtedness limitations. The purpose of the Article is two-fold. First, it intends
to be a tool for students, practitioners, and lawmakers desiring to learn more
about the complexities of this important tax preference attached to homeownership. Second, it explores the many rules of statutory interpretation and construction used by the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) and the courts in ar1

See Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40 (disregarding “sham” divorces obtained to manipulate, for federal income tax purposes, an individual’s marital status as of the close of a tax
year).
2
Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015).
3
Id. at 1068.
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riving at very different results in the application of a seemingly straightforward
statute.4
Part I explains the evolution of the deduction for interest paid on indebtedness and the historical events that caused taxpayers increased dependency on
the ability to deduct interest on personal indebtedness. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 and the Reform Act of 1987 are given special attention: the former establishing the first disallowance of a deduction for personal interest with an exception for home mortgage interest, and the latter greatly transforming the home
mortgage interest deduction exception. The congressional intent of both of these tax acts has been critical to the current interpretation of the statute. Part II
considers additional issues that must be addressed prior to claiming a home
mortgage interest deduction, such as the characterization of a payment as interest, taxable year of the interest deduction, election to itemize deductions, and
application to the alternative minimum tax.
Parts III and IV examine recent developments in the interpretation of the
indebtedness limitations on the deductibility of qualified residence interest. Part
III compares and analyzes the Tax Court’s statutory interpretation of the definition of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness in Pau v. Commissioner against the Service’s contrary interpretation of those terms in Revenue Ruling 2010-25. Part IV details the very different application of the
indebtedness limitations to unmarried co-owners of a qualified residence on a
per-residence basis by the Tax Court, in Sophy v. Commissioner, and on a pertaxpayer basis by the Ninth Circuit, in Voss v. Commissioner. Part V relates the
surprising acquiescence by the Internal Revenue Service to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Voss, applying the indebtedness limitations on a per-taxpayer basis.
Finally, in Part VI, the focus shifts to the question of whether the statute
providing a deduction for qualified residence interest should continue in its current form or be phased out over a period of years. The social policy and economic effects of this tax preference are explored, and the cost in foregone revenue of this tax expenditure is examined. Proposals to repeal or limit the current
deduction or convert the current deduction into a more equitable tax credit are
also considered.

4

The distinction between “statutory interpretation” and “statutory construction” has been
stated as follows:
Although the words “interpretation” and “construction” now appear to be used interchangeably, they are epistemologically different and maintaining the distinction is useful. Interpretation
discerns meaning from the words of the statute, possibly as influenced by a variety of extrinsic
sources; construction fills a gap and sometimes reads the statute contrary to its words, and is
similarly influenced.

JASPER L. CUMMINGS, JR., PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL TAX LAWS 18 (2010).
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HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST
DEDUCTION

The deduction for interest on indebtedness is traceable to one of the original Civil War income tax statutes.5 A deduction for all forms of interest on indebtedness was also part of the failed Income Tax Act of 18946 and, after the
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was
part of the Revenue Act of 1913.7 “When laying the framework for the modern
income tax code in 1913, Congress recognized the importance of allowing for
the deduction of expenses incurred in the generation of income, which [was]
consistent with traditional economic theories of taxable income.”8 As a result,
the Revenue Act of 1913 allowed a deduction for all interest paid within the tax
year on all types of indebtedness.9
The legislative history of the interest deduction is “obscure.” 10 Congress
gave no explanation for not distinguishing between interest incurred in the personal affairs of the taxpayer and interest incurred in the business and investment activities of the taxpayer.11 Perhaps, the interest deduction was intended
to equalize the tax treatment of taxpayers who must borrow in order to engage
in personal, business, or for-profit activities and taxpayers who engage in such
activities with their own capital.12 The breadth of the provision, allowing a deduction for all interest paid, may be based on the administrative difficulty in
segregating personal indebtedness from business or investment indebtedness.13
5

Michael Asimow, The Interest Deduction, 24 UCLA L. R EV . 749, 749 (1977); see Act of
Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 469, 480 (amending Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13
Stat. 223 (1864)).
6
Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (1895) (addressing deductions). The
Supreme Court held the Tax Act of 1894 unconstitutional as the tax on the income from real
property was held a direct tax thus violating Article 1, Section 2, clause 3 and Section 9,
clause 4 of the Constitution, requiring direct taxes to be apportioned among the several states
according to population. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895),
vacated by, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI.
7
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1915) (addressing deductions allowed).
8
MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43385, AN ANALYSIS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 1 (2014) (citing 50 CONG. REC. 3832
(1913) (statement of Sen. Borah)).
9
Id. at 1–2.
10
See Asimow, supra note 5.
11
Id. at 749 nn.2–3; see I.R.C. § 262(a) (2012) (disallowing, generally, a deduction “for personal, living, or family expenses”); see also id. § 162(a) (allowing, generally, a deduction for
“all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred” in the course of doing business);
id. § 163(a) (allowing, generally, a deduction for “all interest paid or accrued”).
12
Asimow, supra note 5.
13
Id. at 750. The provision’s breadth may also be the result of high exemption amounts with
the consequence of only a small fraction of individuals being liable for federal income tax in
the 1913 tax year. J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL:
INCOME 4 (11th ed. 2015).
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Arguably, the ability to deduct personal interest endured because of its positive
effect on the economy by stimulating credit purchases.14 The ability to deduct
interest on personal debt encouraged credit purchases of consumer goods and
provided a strong incentive to purchase, rather than rent, a home.15
“The history of federal taxation in the United States mirrors the history of
the nation.”16 With the increase in automobile use during the 1920s, the number
of home mortgages exceeded the number of farm mortgages.17 In the 1930s, the
mortgage industry was strengthened by the creation of the Federal Housing
Administration (“FHA”), which regulated interest rates and the terms of mortgages, and the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), which
provided local banks with federal money to finance home loans.18 Home ownership grew rapidly with the return of soldiers after World War II and, by the
1950s, the majority of homeowners had mortgages.19 As a result of the high tax
rates during and after World War II, the impact of the home interest deduction
on home purchases became significant.20 By the 1960s, 62 percent of Americans owned their own home.21 During the 1970s, individuals began to incur
credit card debt, which also generated a deduction for interest paid on any unpaid balance.22
A. Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 198623 has been called “the most far-reaching and
fundamental revision of the federal income tax system in its history.”24 The
most notable features of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are the significant broadening of the tax base and the dramatic lowering of the rate structure, for both
individual and corporate taxpayers.25 “The new law has dramatically altered the
tax stakes and the planning strategies for virtually every type of taxpayer and

14

Asimow, supra note 5, at 750.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (deduction for real property taxes, providing strong incentives for home ownership); id. § 121(a) (exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence, also providing strong incentives for home ownership).
16
PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 20 (6th ed. 2008).
17
Roger Lowenstein, Tax Break: Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, N.Y.
T IMES MAG., Mar. 5, 2006, at 81.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Steven C. Bourassa & William G. Grigsby, Income Tax Concessions for Owner-Occupied
Housing, 11 H OUSING P OL ’ Y D EBATE 521, 525 (2000).
21
Lowenstein, supra note 17.
22
Id.
23
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
24
JAMES S. EUSTICE ET AL., T HE T AX R EFORM A CT OF 1986: A NALYSIS AND
C OMMENTARY ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-5 (1987).
25
Id. ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-7.
15
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for every form of economic activity.”26 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 included
two major changes to the interest deduction of individual taxpayers: (1) the
ability to deduct investment interest was limited to net investment income;27
and (2) with few exceptions, interest on personal loans became nondeductible.28
A major exception to the general disallowance of a deduction for personal
interest was qualified home mortgage interest.29 Taxpayers could continue to
deduct personal interest on loans secured by a qualified residence, which included the taxpayer’s principal residence and one other residence selected by
the taxpayer.30 Generally, the qualified home mortgage interest deduction was
limited to the lesser of the fair market value of the qualified residence or the
indebtedness secured by the qualified residence to the extent of the purchase
price plus cost of improvements.31 Interest on any portion of the indebtedness
in excess of such amount was not deductible qualified residence interest unless
the indebtedness was incurred for qualified educational or medical expenses.32
If a married couple filed separately, each spouse could take into account only
one of the residences, unless both spouses consented in writing to one spouse
taking into account both residences.33 “Qualified residence interest may include
interest paid by the taxpayer on debt secured by a residence of the taxpayer that
he owns jointly or as a tenant in common, provided that all the requirements for
qualified residence interest are met.”34

26

Id. ¶ 1.02[4], at 1-21.
Tax Reform Act sec. 511(a), § 163(d)(1) (amending I.R.C. § 163(d)). “Net investment
income” is the excess of investment income over investment expenses. I.R.C.
§ 163(d)(4)(A). “Investment income” is the sum of gross income from property held for investment and net gain attributable to the disposition of such property, to the extent not derived from the conduct of a trade or business. Id. § 163(d)(4)(B). Investment interest, which
exceeds net investment income, is subject to an unlimited carryover and is deductible in future years, subject to the investment interest limitation. Id. § 163(d)(2). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a non-corporate taxpayer was permitted to deduct up to $10,000 of investment interest in excess of net investment income. Id. § 163(d)(1) (1982) (amended
1986). Congress strengthened the interest limitation to reduce the potential mismeasurement
of income from the deduction of investment interest in excess of investment income. JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986, at 263 (Comm. Print 1987).
28
Tax Reform Act sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(1) (adding “Disallowance of Deduction for Personal Interest of Individuals” to section 163 of the I.R.C.).
29
Id. sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(2)(D).
30
Id. sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(5)(A)(i).
31
Id. sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(3)(B).
32
Id. sec. 511(b), § 163 (h)(4)(A); see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (stating expenditures of the
amount borrowed as home equity indebtedness are no longer limited to qualified educational
or medical expenditures); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(c)–(e) (1987) (providing methods and formulas for the allocation of indebtedness if the sum of the average balances for the
tax year of all secured indebtedness on a qualified residence exceeds the adjusted purchase
price).
33
Tax Reform Act sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(5)(A)(ii).
34
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27, at 267.
27
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B. Revenue Act of 1987
The Revenue Act of 1987 dramatically amended the provision allowing the
deduction of home mortgage interest.35
The bill amends the definition of qualified residence interest that is treated
as deductible. Under the bill, qualified residence interest includes interest on acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness with respect to a principal
and a second residence of the taxpayer. The maximum amount of home equity
indebtedness is $100,000. The maximum amount of acquisition indebtedness is
$1 million.36

“Qualified residence interest” includes interest paid on acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of
the taxpayer.37 “Acquisition indebtedness” means any indebtedness incurred in
the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a qualified residence and refinanced indebtedness not in excess of the balance of the original
acquisition indebtedness.38 “Home equity indebtedness” means any indebtedness, other than acquisition indebtedness, to the extent the amount of the indebtedness does not exceed the fair market value of a qualified residence reduced by the amount of any acquisition indebtedness.39 As to both acquisition
indebtedness and home equity indebtedness, the indebtedness must be secured
by the residence.40 The term “qualified residence” includes the principal residence41 of the taxpayer and one other residence selected by the taxpayer.42 Mar35

See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10102, 101 Stat.
1330, 1330-384 to -386 (amending I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)). With respect to qualified residence
interest, the law enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 continued, except as otherwise modified by the Tax Revenue Act of 1987. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 802 (1987), as
reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313, 2313-420.
36
H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1032.
37
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A). See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 936, HOME
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 2 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p936.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/UX86-X8Y3].
38
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i).
39
Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i).
40
Qualified residence interest is interest on indebtedness “secured by a security interest valid against a subsequent purchaser . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1032. Indebtedness will
be treated as secured by the taxpayer’s residence even though, “under any applicable State or
local homestead or other debtor protection law . . . the security interest is ineffective or the
enforceability of the security interest is restricted.” I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(C).
41
The term “principal residence” has the same meaning as provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.121.
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i) (exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence); see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(2) (2002) (stating that the residence the taxpayer uses the majority
of the time is ordinarily the taxpayer’s principal residence and listing additional factors to
consider, including: where the taxpayer is employed, files income tax returns, registers to
vote, and registers a car; and where the taxpayer’s family, religious organizations, and recreational clubs are located).
42
I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i). To qualify as a second residence, the term “residence” is defined
by reference to § 280A(d)(1), which requires the residence to be used by the taxpayer during
the tax year for personal purposes for more than the greater of fourteen days or 10 percent of
the days the residence is rented, unless it is not rented for any period during the tax year. Id.
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ried taxpayers filing separately can each claim the interest on only one residence, unless both taxpayers consent in writing that one spouse can claim all of
the interest on both residences.43 The definition of “residence” is broad enough
to include a mobile home, boat, and a house trailer that contains a sleeping
space, toilet, and cooking facilities.44
For each category of qualified residence interest, the Revenue Act of 1987
imposed limitations as to the amount of indebtedness for which the interest is
deductible.45 The maximum amount of acquisition indebtedness is limited to $1
million ($500,000 in the case of married persons filing separate returns),46 and
the maximum amount of home equity indebtedness is limited to $100,000
($50,000 in the case of married persons filing separate returns).47 Interest on
indebtedness in excess of the monetary limitations is nondeductible personal
interest.48 The Committee Reports on the Revenue Act of 1987 summarized the
monetary limitations as follows:
Thus, under the bill, the total amount of a taxpayer’s home equity indebtedness
with respect to his principal residence and a second residence, when combined
with the amount of his acquisition indebtedness with respect to such residences,
may not exceed a $1,100,000 overall limitation ($550,000, in the case of married
individuals filing a separate return).49

In determining which debt (or portion thereof) exceeds the indebtedness
limitations, the Committee Reports state, “until such [Treasury Regulations] are
issued, a reasonable method of allocation must be used.”50 If the taxpayer incurred more than one mortgage loan to acquire and improve the residence and
the mortgage loans have different interest rates, one possible method of allocation is to pro rate the $1 million ceiling between the first and second mortgages.51 Another method of allocation is to approach the loan mortgages based on
priorities, allowing a deduction for the interest on the first mortgage before al§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II). If a taxpayer has more than one second home, the taxpayer may designate annually the one on which the mortgage interest is deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.16310T(p)(3)(iv) (1987) (expounding the original version of Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II), 100 Stat. 2085).
43
I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(ii).
44
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii); see BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 22.02[1][b], at 22-6 (3d ed. 2002) (“Thus, interest on a sixtyfoot pleasure yacht may be deductible, while interest on a fifteen-foot pleasure fishing boat
is nondeductible.”).
45
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10102, 101 Stat.
1330, 1330-384 to -386 (amending I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)).
46
I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)(B)(ii).
47
Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). Expenditures of the amount borrowed as home equity indebtedness
are no longer limited to qualified educational or medical expenditures. H.R. REP. NO. 100391, pt. 2, at 1032 (1987).
48
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1032.
49
Id. at 1033.
50
Id.
51
MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 744.
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lowing a deduction for the interest on the second mortgage, up to the $1 million
maximum amount.52 The Committee Reports provided yet another method of
allocation, “taking debt into account in the chronological order in which it was
incurred or most recently refinanced, with the most recent debt (or portion
thereof) treated as the amount of debt that exceeds the limit.”53
II. OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES AFFECTING THE DEDUCTION OF QUALIFIED
RESIDENCE INTEREST
Before the question of whether a payment is qualified residence interest
can be addressed, an initial determination must be made as to whether the payment is a payment of interest. The Supreme Court defined interest on indebtedness as “compensation for the use or forbearance of money.”54 With regard to
mortgage loans, a distinction must be made between charges compensating the
lender for the loan and charges compensating the lender for services performed
in connection with the loan, for example, appraisal fees, title reports, title insurance, and preparation of loan documents.55 Regardless of the label, “points” are
considered interest for the purposes of Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) section 163 if the points are computed by reference to the amount and terms of the
loan56 and if the points are not withheld from the loan proceeds.57
If the payment is a payment of interest, the next question is in which tax
year the deduction can be taken. The cash method of accounting is used almost
universally by individuals who are wage earners, employees, or other individuals performing personal services, such as doctors and lawyers.58 The cash
method requires income to be reported in the tax year in which the income is
52

Id. at 744–45.
H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1033.
54
Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940).
55
Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54.
56
See Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 C.B. 49. Typically, at the time of closing, home mortgage
loans require the payment of prepaid interest in the form of a flat percentage of the loan
principal, commonly termed “points.” MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 748.
57
See Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54.
58
See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 39.01[5], at 39-9. Permissible methods of tax accounting include the cash receipts and disbursements method, and the accrual method. I.R.C.
§ 446(c)(1)–(2). With exceptions, including qualified personal service corporations, I.R.C.
§ 448 proscribes the use of the cash method by corporations, partnerships with a corporation
as a partner, and tax shelters. Id. § 448(a).
53

[I]ncome is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred that fix the
right to receive the income and the amount of the income can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Under such a method, a liability is incurred, and generally is taken into account for Federal income tax purposes, in the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish
the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy,
and economic performance has occurred with respect to the liability. . . . Applicable provisions
of the Code, the Income Tax Regulations, and other guidance published by the Secretary prescribe the manner in which a liability that has been incurred is taken into account.

Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A) (1960).
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actually or constructively received,59 and deductions to be taken in the tax year
in which payment is actually made.60 Generally, a cash method taxpayer cannot
prepay deductible expenses and take a deduction for the prepaid amount in the
tax year of payment.61 The Supreme Court held that such prepayments result in
the creation of an asset with a life that extends beyond the tax year of payment
and must be allocated to, and deducted in, the years benefited.62
I.R.C. section 461(g)(1) specifically defers a deduction for prepaid interest
by a cash-method taxpayer,63 requiring the taxpayer to capitalize and allocate
the prepaid interest over the tax years in which the interest represents the cost
of borrowed money.64 Although points are prepaid interest and, as such, deductible over the term of the loan, under I.R.C. section 461(g)(2), points paid to acquire or improve the taxpayer’s principal residence may be deducted in the year
paid.65 Assuming the points qualify as deductible interest under I.R.C. section
163(h)(3), the points paid by a cash method taxpayer are deductible in the tax
year paid if: (1) the loan is used to buy, build, or improve the taxpayer’s principal residence and the loan is secured by the residence; (2) the payment of points
is an established business practice in the area where the loan is made; and (3)
the points do not exceed the number of points generally charged in that area.66
However, points paid to refinance a mortgage secured by the taxpayer’s principal residence are not deductible in full in the tax year paid and, therefore, must
be deducted over the period of the new mortgage loan.67

59

Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i). Although not actually reduced to the taxpayer’s possession,
constructive receipt occurs in the tax year in which income is either credited to an account,
set apart, or otherwise made available to be drawn upon at any time. Id. § 1.451-2(a) (as
amended in 1979). Although, under I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A), “qualified residence interest” includes “interest which is paid or accrued” during the tax year, only interest actually paid during the tax year, and not deferred interest capitalized onto principal, is deductible. See
Smoker v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (2013).
60
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i).
61
Id. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1995). The deduction can be taken for the amount of
the expenditure allocable to the tax year of the payment. Id.
62
See generally INDOPCO, Inc., v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
63
See Rev. Proc. 94-27, 1994-1 C.B. 613 (setting forth safe harbor rules for the deductibility
of points paid in connection with the acquisition of a principal residence).
64
I.R.C. § 461(g)(1).
65
Id. § 461(g)(2).
66
Id.; see Rev. Proc. 92-12, 1992-1 C.B. 663 (listing the requirements that must be satisfied
by a cash method taxpayer for points incurred in connection with the purchase of the taxpayer’s principal residence to be fully deductible in the tax year paid) (superseded by Rev. Proc.
94-27, 1994-1 C.B. 613); see also Schubel v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 701, 703–04, 707 (1981)
(holding that points withheld from the loan principal disbursement, and not paid separately
from the taxpayer’s own funds, were not “paid” within the meaning of I.R.C. § 461(g)(2),
therefore, not currently deductible).
67
Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146. In refinancing the home mortgage, any points paid in
respect to any additional indebtedness incurred in connection with the improvement of the
taxpayer’s principal residence is deductible in the tax year paid. Id.
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If a payment meets the requirements of qualified residence interest, the interest deduction is an itemized deduction.68 However, if the standard deduction
is larger than the taxpayer’s aggregate itemized deductions, the taxpayer will
deduct the standard deduction in computing taxable income.69 In such circumstance, the deduction for home mortgage interest is not reflected in the taxpayer’s taxable income. If the taxpayer does elect to itemize deductions, the qualified residence interest deduction is not a “[m]iscellaneous itemized
deduction[],”70 and, therefore, not subject to the 2 percent of adjusted gross income floor under I.R.C. section 67.71 Nevertheless, qualified residence interest
is subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions under I.R.C. section
68.72
Finally, for purposes of the alternative minimum tax (“A.M.T.”), the deduction of qualified residence interest is significantly restricted. The interest on
a home mortgage is deductible for A.M.T. purposes only if the mortgage is taken out to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a taxpayer’s principal residence or a qualified dwelling of the taxpayer.73 Effectively, interest on second
mortgages and home equity loans is not deductible for A.M.T. purposes unless
the proceeds are used for substantial home improvements.74
III. REVENUE RULING 2010-25
In Revenue Ruling 2010-25, the Service interpreted the definition of “qualified residence interest.”75 The holding maximized a taxpayer’s qualified residence interest deduction on the acquisition of a qualified residence.76 In taking

68

I.R.C. § 63(d); see id. § 62(a) (listing the deductions of an individual allowable in computing adjusted gross income).
69
See id. § 63(b).
70
Id. § 67(b).
71
Id. § 67(a).
72
See I.R.C. § 68(a). Generally, a taxpayer whose adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount must reduce the amount of allowable itemized deductions by the lesser of: (1) “3
percent of the excess of adjusted gross income over the [threshold] amount,” or (2) eighty
percent of the otherwise allowable itemized deductions. Id. The three deductions not subject
to the overall limitation on itemized deductions are: “(1) [any] deduction[s] under section
213 (relating to medical, etc. expenses), (2) any deduction for investment interest (as defined
in section 163(d)),” and (3) any deductions under I.R.C. § 165(c)(2), (3) and (d) (relating to
casualty, theft, and wagering losses). Id. § 68(c).
73
Id. § 56(e)(1). The term “principal residence” is within the meaning of I.R.C. § 121 (exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence), and the term qualified dwelling within
the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(h)(4) (definition of a qualified residence for the purposes of the
home mortgage interest deduction). Id. § 56(e)(1)(A)–(B).
74
See id. § 56(e)(1)–(2).
75
Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571.
76
See id.
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this position, the Service stated it would not follow the Tax Court’s decision in
Pau v. Commissioner.77
A. Pau v. Commissioner
In Pau v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered whether the $1,000,000
limitation on acquisition indebtedness restricted the amount of the taxpayers’
deductible qualified residence interest.78 In 1989, taxpayers, who were a married couple, purchased a residence in Hillsborough, California, for $1,780,000,
with an original mortgage amount of $1,330,000.79 In 1990, taxpayers claimed
a qualified residence interest deduction for interest paid on $1,100,000 of indebtedness.80 The Service allowed the taxpayers a deduction but limited the
amount of the deduction to the interest paid on $1 million of indebtedness.81
The taxpayers used the residence as their principal residence at all times.82
Because the acquisition indebtedness incurred exceeded the $1 million limitation, the Tax Court held the taxpayers could not deduct the interest on the
additional $100,000 as home equity indebtedness.83 The taxpayers failed to
demonstrate that the indebtedness in excess of the $1 million limitation was incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving their residence.84
The taxpayers also failed to demonstrate that any part of the $100,000 excess
indebtedness was home equity indebtedness.85 In support of the holding, the
Tax Court quoted I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(C)(i), “home equity indebtedness is
defined as ‘any indebtedness (other than acquisition indebtedness) secured by a
qualified residence.’ ”86
B. Chief Counsel Advice 200940030
The Service, in Chief Counsel Advice (“C.C.A.”) 200940030, addressed
the issue of whether indebtedness incurred to acquire a qualified residence in
excess of $1 million limitation could constitute home equity indebtedness.87 In

77

Id. The Service also stated that it would not follow the decision of Catalano v. Commissioner. See Catalano v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1632, 1636 (2000) (following the Pau
decision that the amount of deductible residence mortgage interest was restricted to the interest paid on $1 million of acquisition indebtedness), rev’d, 279 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 2002).
78
Pau v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1819, 1819 (1997).
79
Id. at 1819, 1823.
80
Id. at 1823.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1826.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. (emphasis in original).
87
Memorandum No. 200940030 from Christopher F. Kane, Branch Chief of Income Tax &
Accounting, Internal Revenue Serv. Office of Chief Counsel, to Samuel Berman, Special
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addressing this question, C.C.A. 200940030 considered a taxpayer who purchased a principal residence for $1.5 million; the taxpayer paid $200,000 cash
and borrowed the remaining $1.3 million through a loan secured by the residence.88
The Service noted that the definition of home equity indebtedness is indebtedness, other than acquisition indebtedness, secured by the residence subject to fair market value and $100,000 limitations.89 As stated by the Service,
“the resolution of the issue depends on the definition of ‘acquisition indebtedness,’ ”90 which has two possible interpretations.91 “Under the first interpretation, acquisition indebtedness means all indebtedness, regardless of amount,
incurred to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a qualified residence.”92
Under this interpretation, the $1 million indebtedness limitation is not an element of the definition but a separate limit on deductibility, and, as such, any
indebtedness in excess of $1 million remains acquisition indebtedness.93
Under the second interpretation, the $1 million indebtedness limitation is
part of the definition of acquisition indebtedness.94 Under this interpretation, a
taxpayer who borrows in excess of $1 million to acquire, construct, or substantially improve the residence may deduct the excess as home equity indebtedness because the excess is not acquisition indebtedness.95 As a result, the taxpayer can deduct the interest on a total of $1.1 million of qualified residence
interest incurred in the acquisition, construction, and improvement of a qualified residence, assuming compliance with the other requirements of I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(B) and (C).96 The Service concluded that the second interpretation was the better statutory interpretation of the terms “acquisition
indebtedness” and “home equity indebtedness.”97
In addition, the Service found that the second interpretation best comports
with how the term “acquisition indebtedness” is used in other sections of the
Internal Revenue Code;98 I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(A), which defines “qualified
residence interest,” would be rendered meaningless if the $1 million and
$100,000 limitations are not included in the definition of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness.99 I.R.C. section 108(h)(2) provides for exCounsel of Small Business/Self-Employed, Internal Revenue Serv. (Aug. 7, 2009) [hereinafter C.C.A. 200940030].
88
Id. at 2.
89
Id. at 2–3.
90
Id. at 2.
91
Id. at 3.
92
Id. (emphasis added).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
See id. at 2–3.
97
Id. at 3.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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clusion of cancellation of indebtedness income on the discharge of qualified
principal residence indebtedness. 100 This provision adopts, as the definition of
“qualified principal residence indebtedness,” the definition of acquisition indebtedness, citing I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(B), with the substitution of a $2 million indebtedness limitation.101 The increase in limitation amount is necessary
only if the definition of the term acquisition indebtedness includes the $1 million indebtedness limitation.102 Finally, for the purposes of A.M.T. under I.R.C.
section 56(e), “qualified housing interest” is defined, in part, as qualified residence interest under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) paid during the tax year on indebtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving the
principal residence or a qualified dwelling of the taxpayer.103 Clearly, the congressional intent was not to allow a deduction for A.M.T. purposes without a
limitation.104
C. Revenue Ruling 2010-25
In Revenue Ruling 2010-25, the Service ruled that indebtedness incurred
by a taxpayer in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving a qualified
residence could constitute home equity indebtedness to the extent the indebtedness exceeded $1 million, subject to the $100,000 and fair market value limitations.105 In 2009, an unmarried taxpayer purchased a principal residence for
$1.5 million, paying $300,000 and financing the remainder of the purchase
price through a loan secured by the residence.106 Without reference to C.C.A.
200940030, the Service held that the taxpayer could deduct interest paid on an
aggregate indebtedness of $1.1 million as qualified residence interest:
Under § 163(h)(3)(A), the interest on both acquisition indebtedness and
home equity indebtedness is qualified residence interest. Therefore, for 2009
Taxpayer may deduct interest paid on indebtedness of $1,100,000 as qualified
residence interest. Any interest Taxpayer paid on the remaining indebtedness of
$100,000 is nondeductible personal interest under § 163(h).107

100

Id.; see I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (2012).
C.C.A. 200940030, supra note 87, at 4; see I.R.C. § 108(h)(2).
102
C.C.A. 200940030, supra note 87, at 4. The discharge of qualified principal residence
indebtedness was excluded from gross income under I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E), and was extended through December 31, 2016. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114113, § 151(a), 129 Stat. 2242, 3065 (2015).
103
C.C.A. 200940030, supra note 87, at 4.
104
See id. at 5.
105
Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571.
106
Id.
107
Id.
101

Fall 2016]

QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST DEDUCTION

213

IV. QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST AND UNMARRIED CO-OWNERS
Whether same sex or opposite sex, unmarried couples often take joint title
to dwelling units used as a principal resident or as a second residence.108 Individuals, who are not a couple, also may co-own dwelling units used as a principal residence or as a second residence.109 For example, second homes located in
recreational areas may be owned by several families or residences located in
areas of the country with high property values may be owned by multiple families.110 Whatever the circumstance, whether the statutory limits on acquisition
indebtedness and home equity indebtedness apply to unmarried co-owners on a
per-residence basis or a per-taxpayer basis makes a significant difference in the
taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.111
Recently, the Service and the courts have provided conflicting interpretations of the indebtedness limitations included in the definitions of “acquisition
indebtedness” and “home equity indebtedness.”112 Acquisition indebtedness is
defined by statute as any indebtedness that is incurred in (or indebtedness resulting from the refinancing of indebtedness incurred in) acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving a qualified residence and is secured by the residence.113 Acquisition indebtedness is limited to an aggregate amount of
indebtedness not to exceed $1 million ($500,000 in the case of a married person filing a separate return).114 Home equity indebtedness is defined by statute
as any indebtedness (other than acquisition indebtedness) to the extent that the
fair market value of a qualified residence exceeds the amount of the acquisition
indebtedness on the residence.115 Home equity indebtedness is limited to an aggregate amount of indebtedness not to exceed $100,000 ($50,000 in the case of
a married person filing a separate return).116
A. The Marriage Bonus and the Marriage Penalty
Marriage often affects tax liability of a couple, resulting in a marriage
penalty (an increase in tax liability) or a marriage bonus (a decrease in tax liability). In fact, a marriage penalty was embedded in the Revenue Act of 1913,
which allowed a personal exemption of $3,000 for a single individual and
$4,000 for married individuals.117 In 1948, a significant marriage bonus was
108

Brief for Professor Patricia Cain et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, at 10,
Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 12-73257, 12-73261).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See generally id. at 10–13.
112
See supra Part III.
113
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
114
Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
115
Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i).
116
Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii).
117
Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the “Marriage Penalty” Problem, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 908 n.4 (1999). Single taxpayers with income greater than $3,000 and
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created by the adoption of a separate rate schedule for married couples filing a
joint return.118 The joint return is a form of income splitting enacted to alleviate
the tax disparity between community property states and common law states.119
Often, joint filing results in a marriage bonus, which is greatest if one spouse is
the sole or primary income earner.120 In response to criticism of the marriage
bonus created by the joint return, in 1951, Congress enacted a special rate
schedule for heads of household and, in 1954, allowed surviving spouses to use
the joint return rates for two years following the deceased spouse’s death.121
Due to continuing complaints, in 1969, Congress enacted a new rate schedule
for unmarried individuals, which created a marriage penalty for married individuals who earn relatively equal amounts of income.122
Even though one of the spouses has neither income or deductions, married
individuals may file a single return jointly if the following requirements are
met:
(1) they are married at the close of the taxable year or, if one dies before the
close of the table year, at the time of the decedent’s death; (2) neither spouse is a
nonresident alien at any time during the taxable year; and (3) husband and wife
have the same taxable year, with an exception for different table years resulting
from death.123

If a joint return is filed, the income and deductions of the couple are computed
on an aggregate basis, with each spouse being jointly and severally liable for
any taxes due.124 If married individuals file separate returns, each spouse re-

married taxpayers with income greater than $4,000 were subject to a 1 percent tax rate. Act
of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §§ II(A)(1), II(C), 38 Stat. 114, 166, 168. High-income taxpayers
were subject to an additional tax that resulted in progressive, combined rates of 1 percent to
6 percent. Id. § II(A)(2). The $3,000 and $4,000 exemption amounts adjust for inflation; this
is equivalent to $66,100 and $88,100, respectively, in 2010. See generally CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997) (examining the ways in which federal tax law affects the income taxes that married couples pay
and how demographic and labor market changes have altered those effects).
118
Ellen D. Cook, No Simple Solution for the Marriage Penalty Quandary, 64 PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES 160, 161 (2000).
119
BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[2], at 44-19. Generally, income is taxed to the
earner thereof, and the basic principal of the community property system is that each spouse
has a present interest in one half of the couple’s income from personal services or from
community property; therefore, one half of the couple’s community income for the tax year
is taxable to each spouse. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 116–17 (1930) (citing Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)).
120
BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[5], at 44-28.
121
Id.
122
See id. ¶ 44.02[5], at 44-28 to -29 (discussing additional legislation enacted by Congress
to alleviate the marriage penalty). See generally MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 1310
(discussing competing and conflicting policy objectives in the choice of taxable units).
123
I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2012); BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[2][a], at 44-21.
124
See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
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ports the income and deductions generated by that spouse.125 The determination
of whether an individual is married is made as of the close of the individual’s
tax year.126
In recent years, considerable interest has been directed at alleviating or
eliminating the marriage penalty.127 However, any legislative reform aimed at
relieving the marriage penalty in order to benefit two-earner couples have been
attacked as unfair to one-earner couples, unmarried taxpayers, or both.128 Effective as of 2012, the marriage penalty was removed from the 10 and 15 percent
tax brackets and the standard deduction.129 Nevertheless, the marriage penalty
is still embedded in the other tax brackets, and in the many threshold and phase
out amounts found throughout the I.R.C.130 A recent example of the continuance of the marriage penalty is I.R.C. section 1411, which imposes a 3.8 percent tax on net investment income,131 allows an untaxed threshold amount of
$250,000 for joint filers, and $200,000 for all other filers.132 Other sections of
the I.R.C. that contain a marriage penalty include, but are not limited to: I.R.C.
section 1(h) (20 percent capital gains rate on high-income taxpayers); I.R.C.
section 24 (child care credit); I.R.C. section 32 (earned income credit); I.R.C.
section 68 (overall limitation on itemized deductions); I.R.C. section 86 (taxation of social security benefits); I.R.C. 151 (deduction for personal exemptions); and I.R.C. section 1211 (deduction of net capital losses).133

125

BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[2][c], at 44-24.
I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1). If the individual’s spouse dies during the tax year, the determination
of whether an individual is married is made on the date of the spouse’s death. Id. Individuals
legally separated from their spouse under a decree of divorce or legal separation are not considered married for federal income tax purposes. Id. § 7703(a)(2). If the taxpayer’s spouse is
not a member of the household during the last six months of the tax year, a married taxpayer
filing a separate return is treated as unmarried for the purposes of determining the taxpayer’s
entitlement to personal exemptions and head of household status. Id. § 7703(b)(3). See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 21419 (1996), limiting the meaning of
the words “marriage” to a legal union between one man and one woman and “spouse” to a
person of the opposite sex, is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201
(holding, for federal tax purposes, the marital status of an individual of the same sex who is
lawfully married under the law of the state that recognizes such marriages will be recognized).
127
BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[5], at 44-30.
128
Id.
129
See id. ¶ 44.02[5], at S44-16 (Supp. II 2016).
130
See Cook, supra note 118, at 165–66.
131
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1411(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1029, 1061 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1)(A)
(2012)).
132
I.R.C. § 1411(b). The 3.8 percent tax is imposed on the lesser of: (1) net investment income for the tax year; or (2) the taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income for the tax year
over the threshold amount. Id. § 1411(a)(1)(A)–(B).
133
I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 24, 32, 68, 86, 151, 1211.
126
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B. Chief Counsel Advice 200911007
In C.C.A. 200911007, the Service addressed the issue of how to apply the
$1 million limitation on acquisition indebtedness where the taxpayer is a partial
owner of the residence for which the total acquisition indebtedness exceeds $1
million.134 The taxpayer financed the acquisition of a residence by obtaining a
loan in excess of $1 million, secured by the residence.135 The next year, the
taxpayer transferred the residence to himself and a co-owner as joint tenants,
who was added as an additional obligor on the mortgage.136 Both the taxpayer
and the co-owner used the residence as their principal residence.137 For the first
two tax years at issue, the taxpayer paid all of the interest due on the mortgage
and, during the third tax year, the taxpayer and the co-owner each paid a percentage of the interest due on the mortgage.138 For the third tax year, the taxpayer argued that the $1 million indebtedness limitation on acquisition indebtedness should be interpreted to allow a $1 million limitation for each the
taxpayer and the co-owner.139
In response, the Service stated that the plain language of the statute did not
support this interpretation.140 Under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(B)(i), “acquisition
indebtedness is defined [] as indebtedness incurred in acquiring a qualified residence of the taxpayer—not as indebtedness incurred in acquiring taxpayer’s
portion of a qualified residence.”141 “The entire amount of indebtedness incurred in acquiring the qualified residence constitutes acquisition indebtedness
under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(A)(i). . . . However, under I.R.C. section
163(h)(3)(B)(ii), the amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for purposes of
the qualified residence interest deduction is limited to $1,000,000. . .”142 In
support, the Service noted the parenthetical language in I.R.C. section
163(h)(3)(B)(ii), which limits the amount treated as acquisition indebtedness to
$500,000 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return.143
134

Memorandum No. 200911007 from John P. Moriarty, Chief of Income Tax & Accounting Branch 1, Internal Revenue Serv. Office of Chief Counsel, to Catherine G. Chang, Att’y,
San Francisco, Internal Revenue Serv., at 2 (Nov. 24, 2008) hereinafter C.C.A. 200911007].
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 4.
140
Id.
141
Id. (emphasis in original).
142
Id. As the legal and equitable owner of the property, the taxpayer was entitled to deduct
the interest actually paid on the mortgage. Id. at 3. If the average balance of the indebtedness
exceeds the indebtedness limitation, the amount of deductible qualified residence interest
with respect to the indebtedness is determined by multiplying the interest paid with respect
to the debt by a fraction, the numerator of which is the applicable indebtedness limitation
and the denominator of which is the average balance of the indebtedness. Id. at 4 (citing
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(e) (1987)).
143
Id. at 4.
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The Service concluded that the $1 million indebtedness limitation is used
to determine the portion of the qualified residence interest that the taxpayer
may be deducted.144 The formula for determining the amount of qualified residence interest deductible by the taxpayer is as follows: multiply the amount of
interest actually paid by the taxpayer by a fraction, the numerator of which is
$1 million and the denominator of which is the average balance of the outstanding acquisition indebtedness in the tax year at issue.145
C. Sophy v. Commissioner
In Sophy v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered the question of
whether the statutory limitations on acquisition indebtedness and home equity
indebtedness should be applied to unmarried co-owners on a per-residence or
per-taxpayer basis.146 Charles J. Sophy and Bruce H. Voss were domestic partners registered with the State of California.147 Between 2000 and 2002, the taxpayers purchased residences in Rancho Mirage, California, and Beverly Hills,
California.148 Both residences were financed and refinanced with indebtedness
secured by the residences for which the taxpayers were jointly and severally
liable.149 The taxpayers took title to the residences as joint tenants.150 During
the tax years at issue, the taxpayers used the Beverly Hills residence as their
principal residence and the Rancho Mirage residence as their second residence.151 In 2006 and 2007, the total average balance for the home mortgages
and home equity lines of credit was $2,703,568 and $2,669,136, respectively.152
For tax years 2006 and 2007, the taxpayers each filed separate federal income tax returns and each claimed a home mortgage interest deduction under
I.R.C. section 163(h)(3).153 Their sole contention was that the $1 million and
$100,000 indebtedness limitations apply to a residence co-owned by unmarried
individuals on a per-taxpayer basis.154 The Service’s position was that the indebtedness limitations apply on a per-residence basis, regardless of the number
144

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(e) (1987)).
146
Sophy v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 204, 209 (2012), rev’d, Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th
Cir. 2015).
147
Voss, 796 F.3d at 1055. “Domestic partners are two adults who have chosen to share one
another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.” CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 297(a) (2012); see also id. §§ 297–299.6 (providing the rules applicable to domestic partners and domestic partnerships).
148
Sophy, 138 T.C. at 205.
149
Id. at 205–06.
150
Id. at 205.
151
Id. at 206.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 206–07.
154
Id. at 209; see supra Part III (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200940030 and
Revenue Ruling 2010-25, which allows for the aggregation of the indebtedness limitations
upon the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a qualified residence).
145
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of owners and whether or not the co-owners are married to each other.155 Following the reasoning of C.C.A. 200911007,156 the co-owners were collectively
limited to a deduction for qualified mortgage interest paid on a maximum of
$1.1 million of acquisition and home equity indebtedness.157 The Service computed the limitation ratio as $1.1 million over the average balance of the qualifying loans.158 The limitation ratio was then multiplied by the amount of qualified mortgage interest paid by each taxpayer during the tax year to arrive at the
amount of deductible interest.159 Each taxpayer filed a petition with the Tax
Court, and the two cases were consolidated.160
In Sophy, after reviewing the language of the statute and the legislative intent, the Tax Court concluded that the indebtedness limitations are properly applied on a per-residence basis.161 The analysis began with a close examination
of the definitions of “acquisition indebtedness” and “home equity indebtedness,” noting that the word “taxpayer” is not used in relation to either type of
indebtedness.162 Further, in defining “qualified residence interest,” the terms
“acquisition indebtedness” and “home equity indebtedness” focus on the individual taxpayer only with regard to the qualified residence and not to the indebtedness.163 Congress’s use of the phrase “any indebtedness” without the
phrase being qualified by language referring to an individual taxpayer led to the
conclusion by the Tax Court that the focus of the statutory limitations is the
amount of indebtedness with respect to the residence rather than the amount of
indebtedness with respect to the individual taxpayer.164

155

Sophy, 138 T.C. at 209; see also Bronstein v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 382, 382–83 (2012)
(holding that a married woman, filing separately, with title to her principal residence held in
her name and the name of her father-in-law, was limited to qualified residence interest on
$550,000 of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness).
156
Sophy, 138 T.C. at 206–07; see also supra Part IV B (discussing the Service’s position in
C.C.A. 200911007 that the acquisition indebtedness limitation applies on a per-residence
basis).
157
Sophy, 138 T.C. at 209.
158
Id. at 207.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 204–05.
161
Id. at 213. In interpreting the statute, the Tax Court began by stating that its purpose was
to give effect to Congress’s intent, and that the statutory language was the most persuasive
evidence of statutory purpose. Id. at 209. The Tax Court then listed several rules of statutory
interpretation: (1) “the words of the statute should be construed in their ordinary, everyday,
and plain meaning;” (2) “usually the meaning of the statutory language is conclusive;” (3) if
a statute is silent or ambiguous, the statute’s legislative history may be considered in an attempt to determine congressional intent; and (4) if a statute appears clear on its face, unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose is necessary before interpreting the statute contrary
to its plain meaning. Id. at 209–10.
162
Id. at 210.
163
Id. The home equity indebtedness is also “reduced by the amount of acquisition indebtedness with respect to such residence.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
164
Id. at 210–11.

Fall 2016]

QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST DEDUCTION

219

The Tax Court relied on several rules of statutory construction to further
dispel the taxpayer’s per-taxpayer interpretation of the statue. First, if Congress
uses language in one section of a statute but not another section of the same
statute, the presumption is that the omission by Congress is intentional and
purposeful.165 Although Congress refers to the “taxpayer” several times in
I.R.C. section 163(h), no reference to an individual taxpayer is made in the indebtedness limitation language.166 Second, a statute should be construed to prevent a clause, sentence, or word from being superfluous, void, or insignificant.167 Congress’s repeated use of phrases such as “with respect to any
qualified residence” and “with respect to such residence” in conjunction with
terms, which, by their own definitions, already relate to a qualified residence,
would be superfluous if the indebtedness limitations were applied on a pertaxpayer basis.168 Third, a statute must be construed not in isolation but as part
of a statutory scheme.169 With I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) taken as a whole, Congress’s repeated references to such phrases “emphasize the point that qualified
residence interest and the related indebtedness limitations are residence focused
rather than taxpayer focused.”170
Finally, the Tax Court found support for applying the indebtedness limitations on a per-residence basis in the parenthetical language addressing married
persons filing separate returns.171 In the case of a married individual filing a
separate return, the parenthetical language limits acquisition indebtedness to
$500,000 and home equity indebtedness to $50,000.172 This language suggests,
“without expressly stating, that co-owners who are married to each other and
file a joint return are limited to a deduction of interest on $1 million of acquisition indebtedness and $100,000 of home equity indebtedness.”173 The Tax
Court found unpersuasive the taxpayers’ argument that this parenthetical language, which creates a marriage penalty, does not apply to unmarried coowners in light of the residence-focused language of I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)
and the absence of any reference to an individual taxpayer in the indebtedness
limitations.174 Rather than establishing a marriage penalty, the Tax Court reasoned the parenthetical language merely implies that unmarried co-owners may
allocate the indebtedness limitation amounts in a different manner, such as according to percentage of ownership.175
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D. Voss v. Commissioner
In Voss v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision in Sophy.176 The Ninth Circuit was called upon to decide an issue of first
impression: whether the acquisition indebtedness limitation and the home equity indebtedness limitation apply on a per-taxpayer basis or a per-residence basis
if the qualified residence is owned by multiple unmarried taxpayers.177 Inferring from the statute’s treatment of married taxpayers filing separate returns,
the Ninth Circuit held that the indebtedness limitations on qualified residence
interest apply to unmarried co-owners on a per-taxpayer basis.178 Thus, each
co-owner is entitled to an aggregate $1.1 million indebtedness limitation
amount.179 Before reviewing the applicable statutory language, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[s]ection 163 of the Internal Revenue Code governs the deductibility of interest on a taxpayer’s indebtedness. This section of the Tax Code,
like much of the Code, is complex—it requires attention to definitions within
definitions and exceptions upon exceptions.”180
The Ninth Circuit began by stating that Congress could have drafted the
statute to make clear whether the indebtedness limitations apply to unmarried
co-owners of a qualified residence on a per-taxpayer basis or a per-residence
basis.181 Although the statute is silent on this point, the Ninth Circuit noted that
it was not entirely without textual guidance.182 The statute is clear as to the application of the indebtedness limitations to one type of co-ownership that of
married individuals filing separate returns.183 Both indebtedness limitations
contain parenthetical language that allows only 50 percent of the indebtedness
limitation amounts “in the case of a married individual filing a separate return.”184 Congress’s use of the phrase “in the case of” suggests that the parentheticals are exceptions to the general indebtedness limitations.185 This language also suggests “parallelism between the parenthetical language and the
main clause of that provision.”186 The Ninth Circuit stated that the parenthetical
176

Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1057.
178
Id. at 1057–59.
179
Id. at 1068; see supra Part III B (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200940030
and Revenue Ruling 2010-25, which allows the aggregation of the indebtedness limitations
upon the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a qualified residence). If a
taxpayer’s total mortgage indebtedness exceeds the limitations, the Tax Court provides the
“usual” method for calculating qualified residence interest: multiply the total interest paid by
a ratio of the statutory indebtedness limitation over total indebtedness. Voss, 796 F.3d at
1054 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(e) (1987)).
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Voss, 796 F.3d at 1053.
181
Id. at 1058–59.
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Id. at 1058.
183
Id.
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Id. (quoting I.C.R. § 163(h)(3)(B) (2012)).
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Id.
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language offers three useful insights into the interpretation of the general indebtedness limitations.187
First, the parenthetical language clearly speaks in per-taxpayer terms in referring to a “married individual,” even though married individuals commonly
co-own their homes and are jointly and severally liable on any mortgage.188
This per-taxpayer wording, along with the phrase “in the case of,” suggests that
the wording of the main clause, especially the phrase “aggregate amount treated,” should be applied in a per-taxpayer manner.189
Second, the parenthetical language not only speaks in per-taxpayer terms
but also operates in a per-taxpayer manner.190 Each spouse filing a separate return is subject to aggregate indebtedness limitations of $550,000;191 thus,
spouses filing jointly are subject to an aggregate indebtedness limitations of
$1.1 million, which are the indebtedness limitations for a single taxpayer.192
The parentheticals do not subject both spouses jointly to aggregate indebtedness limitations of $550,000 but “ensur[e] that a married couple filing separate
returns is treated the same as a couple filing a joint return.”193 Both the Service
and the Tax Court agree that the parenthetical limitations apply on a per-spouse
basis; therefore, the indebtedness limitations for unmarried individuals should
also apply on a per-taxpayer basis.194
Third, the very inclusion of the parenthetical suggests that the indebtedness
limitations apply on a per-taxpayer basis.195 Applying the rule of statutory construction that a statute should not be interpreted in a way that renders a provision superfluous,196 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the parenthetical language
would be superfluous if the indebtedness limitations applied on a per-residence
basis.197 In that case, the parenthetical limiting two spouses filing separately to
an indebtedness limitation of $550,000 each would be unnecessary.198 The Tax
Court’s reasoning that Congress included the parenthetical language to establish a 50 percent allocation of the indebtedness limitations amount was unpersuasive.199 Congress’s inclusion of the parenthetical language merely to prevent
spouses from otherwise allocating indebtedness limitation amounts is unlikely,
especially as most married couples own their homes as equal partners.200
187
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The Ninth Circuit noted that Congress has enacted a number of tax statutes
that halved deductions, credits, or limitations for spouses filing separately.201
Examples include: (1) I.R.C. section 22 (a credit for the elderly and the permanently or totally disabled); (2) I.R.C. section 1202 (a 50 percent exclusion for
gain from the sale of certain small business stock); and (3) I.R.C. section
1211(b) (a deduction limit for excess capital losses).202 Thus, demonstrating
Congress’s awareness that treating joint filers as one taxpayer and separate filers as two taxpayers ensures that separately filing couples do not receive double
the benefit that jointly filing couples receive.203 Finally, if Congress intended
two or more unmarried taxpayers to be treated as a single taxpayer for the purpose of a particular deduction or credit, Congress could have used the necessary language.204 For example, I.R.C. section 36(b) specifically limits the
amount of the tax credit to $8,000 for first-time homebuyers regardless of the
number of unmarried co-owners.205
In Sophy, upon close examination of the definitions of qualified residence
interest, acquisition indebtedness, and home equity indebtedness, the Tax Court
rejected the per-taxpayer interpretation of the indebtedness limitations, finding
the general “focus” of the statute was on the qualified residence and the “conspicuous absence” of “any reference to an individual taxpayer.”206 However,
the Ninth Circuit observed that the repeated reference to the residence was only
natural in a statute providing a deduction for interest paid on indebtedness with
respect to a qualified residence.207 The Ninth Circuit stated that additional references to the taxpayer could have been included, but such additional references are unnecessary as “[a]ny reasonable reader would understand that the
statute is speaking of a taxpayer.”208
Finding nothing in the statute to support the Tax Court’s per-residence interpretation, the Ninth Circuit found several provisions of the statute that support a per-taxpayer interpretation.209 First, the definition of “qualified residence
interest” refers to interest paid during the “taxable year,” and the indebtedness
limitations refer to “for any period,” clearly referring to the “taxable year.”210
Taxpayers, not residences, have tax years, and taxpayers may have different tax
years.211 Nevertheless, I.R.C. section 163(h) speaks in terms of a single tax
year, implying that the indebtedness limitations apply on a per-taxpayer ba201
202
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204
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sis.212 Moreover, under the per-residence approach, the method of applying the
indebtedness limitations to co-owners with different tax years is unclear.213
The Ninth Circuit also found the Tax Court’s per-residence interpretation
difficult to reconcile with the statute’s definition of “qualified residence.”214
I.R.C. section 163(h)(4)(A) defines qualified residence as
the principal residence (within the meaning of section 121) of the taxpayer, and
1 other residence of the taxpayer which is selected by the taxpayer for purposes
of this subsection for the taxable year and which is used by the taxpayer as a residence (within the meaning of section 280A(d)(1)).215

If the taxpayer owns multiple secondary residences, the taxpayer can annually
select a different residence as the other residence.216 The definition of a qualified residence clearly focuses on the taxpayer.217 In addition, the Tax Court’s
per-residence approach would be difficult to apply to co-owners of a residence
each having a different qualified residence.218 By contrast, a per-taxpayer approach would be easy to apply to co-owners with multiple residences.219 The
Ninth Circuit opinion included the following example:
[T]wo individuals might each have a separate primary residence but go in together on a vacation home in Maui. For such co-owners, filing tax returns under
the Tax Court’s per-residence approach would be like running a three-legged
race. The co-owners are tied together for one home but not the other. This would
mean that the two (or it could be three or four) co-owners would have to coordinate their tax returns to ensure that the aggregate amount of acquisition debt for
each taxpayer’s “qualified residence” does not exceed $1 million. It would also
mean that one co-owner’s deduction might depend on the size of another coowner’s mortgage on a home in which the first co-owner has no interest.220

Finally, the fact that the parenthetical language creates a marriage penalty
is not of significant concern to the Ninth Circuit.221 The Ninth Circuit noted that
“Congress may have had perfectly legitimate reasons for distinguishing between married and unmarried taxpayers.”222 Significant tax benefits may result
to a married couple opting to file a joint return, such as lower tax rates at various income levels.223 Further, if a married taxpayer filing a separate return is
limited to an aggregate of $550,000 of indebtedness, implicitly, a married cou212
213
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ple filing a joint return is limited to an aggregate of $1.1 million of indebtedness.224 The apparent purpose of the parenthetical is to ensure that married couples are treated as a single taxpayer regardless of whether they file separately or
jointly.225 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit noted:
If two individuals who are engaged to be married each own their own house and
each have their own $1 million mortgage, both get to deduct all of their interest.
But if they get married and file a joint return, they are treated as one taxpayer
and can then only deduct half of their interest.226

E. Voss Dissent
The dissent in Voss laments that the interpretation by the majority of the
indebtedness limitations allows unmarried taxpayers, who buy “an expensive
residence,” to deduct twice the amount of the interest paid on indebtedness than
married taxpayers.227 Since the language of the statute is ambiguous, the reasonable interpretation by the Service that limits unmarried taxpayers to the
same amount of qualified residence interest deduction as married taxpayers filing jointly should be given deference.228
In C.C.A. 200911007, the Service’s application of the statute is straightforward.229 With regards to a single taxpayer, only interest payments on a maximum of $1.1 million of indebtedness are deductible under I.R.C. section
163(h)(3).230 Similarly, a married couple filing jointly is subject to the $1.1 million indebtedness limitations, which is consistent with the typical treatment of a
married couple filing jointly as one taxpayer under the I.R.C.231 As to an unmarried co-owner, the Service interpreted the statute to limit the deduction of
qualified residence interest to a maximum of $1.1 million of indebtedness.232
The dissent rejects the taxpayer’s interpretation of I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)
as contrary to the Service’s reasonable and persuasive interpretation of the statute in C.C.A. 200911007.233 The plain meaning of the statute does not compel
the taxpayer’s interpretation that the indebtedness limitations apply on a pertaxpayer basis, allowing unmarried co-owners double the deductible interest of

224

Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1065.
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Id.
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Id. at 1068 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
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Id.
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Id. at 1069; see supra Part IV B (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200911007
that the acquisition indebtedness limitation applies on a per-residence basis).
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Voss, 796 F.3d at 1069 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 95 and
105 (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200940030 and Revenue Ruling 2010-25,
which allows for the aggregation of the indebtedness limitations upon the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a qualified residence).
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Voss, 796 F.3d at 1069 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
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single taxpayers or married taxpayers filing jointly.234 Rather, the statute does
not indicate how the indebtedness limitations are to be applied to multiple coowners. In such a circumstance, “we can afford respect to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, whether it is offered in an opinion letter, policy statement,
agency manual, or even a well-reasoned legal brief.”235 The dissent further
states that the measure of deference to which an agency’s interpretation is entitled is proportional to the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade.”236
In response, the majority agrees that C.C.A. 200911007 is entitled to the
“measure of deference proportional to the ‘thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’ ”237 Applying these factors, the majority suggests that C.C.A. 200911007 should be
given “limited weight.”238 The majority held the one-paragraph analysis interpreting the application of the statute to unmarried co-owners was neither thorough nor exhaustive.239 C.C.A. 200911007 treats the question as governed by
the “plain language of the statute.”240 However, the majority finds that the
briefs of the parties, the Tax Court decision, and the statute itself demonstrate
that the statute’s language is anything but plain.241 The approach taken in
C.C.A. 200911007 was not a consistent position, established understanding, or
comparable consensus of the Service.242 Other than the Service’s litigation po234

See id.
Id. (citing Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
236
Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)). The dissent supported the position taken by the Service in C.C.A. 200911007 as reasonable and persuasive,
arguing: (1) the Service’s interpretation is consistent with the text of the statute that can be
read to establish indebtedness limitations of $1.1 million per qualified residence regardless
of the number of co-owners; (2) the Service’s interpretation does not result in a windfall to
unmarried taxpayers; and (3) the Service has consistently applied its interpretation of the
I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) indebtedness limitations. Id. at 1071–72. The dissent stated: “A
more logical inference is that the deduction was aimed at promoting home ownership for ordinary folks, not to help wealthy individuals purchase mansions that are encumbered with
more than $1.1 million of debt.” Id. at 1072. Disagreeing with the analysis of the majority,
the dissent further argues, in summary: (1) other than referencing the definition of a “qualified residence,” nothing indicates that either Congress or the Service contemplated that the
approach used in I.R.C. section 121 should determine the amount of indebtedness limitations
under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3); (2) the parenthetical language does not provide textual support for a per-taxpayer approach; and (3) there are practical difficulties in determining the
amount of qualified residence interest deduction of each unmarried co-owner under a perresidence interpretation. Id. at 1072–75.
237
Id. at 1066 (majority opinion) (quoting Christopher v. Smith Kline Beecham Corp. 132 S.
Ct. 2156, 2168–69 (2012)).
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sition in this case, C.C.A. 200911007 is the only pronouncement addressing
how the indebtedness limitations apply to unmarried co-owners of a qualified
residence.243 “The agency’s guidance is closer to a ‘mere[] . . . litigating position’ than to an ‘agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration.’ ”244 Further,
the majority states:
At bottom, although an IRS Chief Counsel Advice statement “is helpful in
determining the position of the IRS,” it is an internal IRS memorandum prepared
by an individual IRS attorney. The document itself cautions that it “may not be
used or cited as precedent.” Indeed, the IRS could issue a memorandum taking
the opposite position tomorrow, “apparently without revoking the earlier guidance.”245

V. ACTION ON DECISION 2016-02
In Action on Decision (“A.O.D.”) 2016-02, the Service acquiesced to the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Voss.246 In Voss, the Ninth Circuit held that the acquisition indebtedness limitation and the home equity indebtedness limitation
apply to unmarried co-owners of a qualified residence on a per-taxpayer basis
rather than a per-residence basis.247 In A.O.D. 2016-02, the Service announced
that it will follow the Voss opinion and apply the indebtedness limitations on a
per-taxpayer basis.248 Each unmarried co-owner of a qualified residence will be
allowed to deduct interest paid on a maximum of $1 million of acquisition indebtedness and $100,000 of home equity indebtedness pursuant to I.R.C. section 163(h)(3).249 The Service noted that the Ninth Circuit based its conclusion
largely on its interpretation of the parenthetical language expressly providing
that married individuals filing separate returns are entitled to deduct interest on
a maximum of $500,000 of acquisition indebtedness and $50,000 of home equity indebtedness.250 “By providing lower debt limits for married couples, and
not for unmarried co-owners, Congress singled out married couples for specific
treatment, implying that an unmarried co-owner filing a separate return is entitled to deduct interest on up to $1,000,000 of acquisition indebtedness and
$100,000 of home equity indebtedness.”251
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Prior to 1991, the Service only published acquiescence or nonacquiescence
in certain Tax Court decisions.252 Since that time, the Service has expanded its
acquiescence program to include other civil tax cases, including cases before
District Courts, Claims Courts, and Circuit Courts.253 The purpose of an A.O.D
is to provide guidance to Service personnel working with the same or similar
issues.254 An A.O.D. will be relied on within the Service merely as the application of the tax law to the facts of a particular case at the time the A.O.D. was
issued.255 “[A]cquiescence” means that the Service accepts the holding of the
court and “will follow it in disposing of cases with the same controlling
facts.”256 Unlike Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings, an A.O.D. is not
an affirmative statement of the Service’s position, “[i]t is not intended to serve
as public guidance and may not be cited as precedent.”257 An A.O.D. may be
superseded by new legislation, regulations, rulings, cases, or future A.O.D.’s.258
With the Service’s acquiescence to the Voss decision, only Congress can
provide the necessary clarity and certainty in the application of this commonly
used tax provision. Congress must decide whether the application of the indebtedness limitations on a per-taxpayer basis is proper from a tax, fiscal, and social policy perspective and legislate accordingly:
Had Congress wanted to make clear that the debt limits apply per taxpayer, it
could have drafted the provisions to limit “the aggregate amount each taxpayer
may treat as” acquisition or home equity debt. But it did not. Or, had Congress
wanted to make clear that the debt limits apply per residence, it could have provided that the debt limits must be divided or allocated in the event that two or
more unmarried individuals co-own a qualified residence.259

VI. SHOULD THE DEDUCTION FOR QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST BE
REPEALED OR AMENDED?
Should the deduction for qualified residence interest continue in its current
form, be repealed or substantially limited, or replaced with an income tax credit? Congress should address this question because the qualified residence interest deduction is very costly. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that,
for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, the deduction of qualified residence interest
on owner-occupied residences will cost the federal government $419.8 billion
in forgone tax revenue.260 This tax expenditure costs an estimated $85 billion
252
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more than the combined tax cost of the deduction for real property taxes261 and
the exclusion of capital gains on the sale of a principal residence.262 The Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, estimates that, for fiscal
years 2015 through 2025, the deduction of qualified residence interest will result in $948.5 billion in foregone tax revenue263 and is ranked fourth in tax expenditures only behind: (1) exclusion from income of employer contributions to
medical insurance premiums and medical care; (2) exclusion of net imputed
rental income of owner-occupants of a residence; and (3) the lower tax rate for
capital gains, excepting agriculture, timber, iron ore, and coal.264 The Service’s
acquiescence to the application of the indebtedness limitations on a pertaxpayer basis will only increase the cost of this tax preference in foregone revenue.
In addition to viewing tax incentives as direct government spending administered through the tax code, the particular policy objective the tax incentive is
intended to achieve should also be analyzed.265 The deductibility of qualified
residence interest has been defended on the ground that the deduction promotes
tax fairness between taxpayers who own residences without a mortgage and
taxpayers who own residences with a mortgage.266 Then again, homeowners
already receive a tax advantage by not being taxed on imputed rental income as
the owner occupant of the residence, and homeowners with a mortgage would
have less imputed rental income than the homeowner without a mortgage because of the deductible interest expense.267 Of course, taxpayers who do not
own but rent their residence receive neither the tax benefit of the exclusion of
imputed rent nor the deduction for qualified residence interest.268 Further, this
tax incentive is limited to taxpayers with home mortgages and no tax consideration is given to purchasers of other consumer durables, such as automobiles.269
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, in its explanation of the amendments to I.R.C. section 163 by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, stated: “While
Congress recognized that the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing
may be a significant source of untaxed income, the Congress nevertheless de261

See I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (2012).
See id. § 121; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 260, at 32 tbl.1 (subtracting the
total deduction for property taxes on real property ($184.5 billion) and the total Exclusion of
capital gains on sales of principal residences ($149.9 billion) from the total deduction for
mortgage interest on owner-occupied residences ($419.8 billion)).
263
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267
Id. ¶ 22.02, at 22-4.
268
Id.
269
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termined that encouraging home ownership is an important policy goal,
achieved in part by providing a deduction for residential mortgage interest.”270
The most common criticism of the qualified residence interest deduction is
that the deduction benefits the highest-income taxpayers.271 Several factors contribute to this deduction being more valuable to high-income taxpayers than
low-income taxpayers.272 First, as a result of the progressive rate structure of
the federal income tax, the value of an itemized deduction depends on the taxpayer’s marginal rate.273 For example, a taxpayer with a top marginal rate of
39.6 percent would save $39.60 from an additional $100 of qualified residence
interest deduction whereas a taxpayer with a top marginal rate of 25 percent
would save only $25.
Second, to claim a deduction for qualified residence interest, taxpayers
must itemize their deductions rather than claim a standard deduction in filing
their federal tax returns.274 Although real estate, home building, and mortgage
lending organizations attempt to portray the qualified residence interest deduction as vital to the middle class,275 the analysis of the data by the Joint Committee on Taxation tells a different story. For the 2014 tax year, the Joint Committee on Taxation determined that only approximately 39 percent of taxpayers
itemized their deductions.276 Further, low-income taxpayers tend not to own
residences, or, if a residence is owned, the purchase price and correspondingly
the mortgage is generally less than high-income taxpayers.277 The President’s
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform has criticized the qualified residence
interest deduction for primarily encouraging construction of larger homes and
not necessarily broadening home ownership among the middle-income taxpayers.278
Recently, numerous proposals to modify the qualified residence interest
deduction have emerged, including the following alternatives and considerations: (1) retain the current deduction; (2) repeal the current deduction; (3) limit
the current deduction; or (4) replace the current deduction with a credit.
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See id. at 3; Gerald Prante, Who Benefits from the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction?,
TAX FOUND. (Feb. 6, 2006), http://taxfoundation.org/article/who-benefits-home-mortgageinterest-deduction [https://perma.cc/4UBA-Z9FR].
273
FISCHER & HUANG, supra note 271, at 4; Prante, supra note 272.
274
FISCHER & HUANG, supra note 271, at 2; Prante, supra note 272.
275
See Prante, supra note 272.
276
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 260, at 43 tbl.2 (dividing the total Itemized Return (45,953) by the Total Returns (168,943)).
277
FISCHER & HUANG, supra note 271; Prante, supra note 272.
278
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 73–74 (2005).
271

230

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:199

A. Retain the Current Deduction
I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) could remain in its current form. The qualified residence interest deduction is popular among homeowners and industry groups,
such as the National Association of Realtors, the National Association of
Homebuilders, and the Mortgage Bankers Association.279 Although it is generally believed to promote the buying of homes,280 economic research suggests
that the deduction may not achieve the policy objective of an increase in homeownership.281
B. Repeal the Current Deduction
Congress could repeal the qualified residence interest deduction, which is
an exception to the general disallowance of deductions for personal interest.
The repeal of I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) would help promote the more uniform
treatment of taxpayers. Taxpayers owning or renting their home or living in different parts of the country282 would have greater tax equality.283 It would also
increase federal revenue, improving the long-term budgetary situation of the
United States.284
With regard to the potential effect on homeownership, economists have
identified the primary barrier to homeownership to be the high transactional
costs of purchasing a home, especially the requirement of a down payment.285
Since the qualified residence interest deduction does not address this primary
barrier and does not target the group of potential homebuyers most in need of
assistance, namely, lower-income households, the effect on homeownership of
eliminating the deduction is likely to be minimal over the long term.286 However, the repeal of the qualified residence interest deduction may have negative
consequences to the economy in the short term.287 For example, the sudden
elimination of the deduction could cause a drop in home demand with a corresponding drop in home prices.288 The decrease in home prices could lead to a
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reduction in new home construction, a reduction in homeowner wealth, and,
possibly, an increase in mortgage defaults.289 Gradually phasing out the qualified residence interest deduction over a period of time may mitigate the negative consequences to the economy and the housing market.290
C. Limit the Current Deduction
Currently, taxpayers may deduct interest on $1 million of acquisition indebtedness and $100,000 of home equity indebtedness, secured by their principal residence or a second designated residence.291 The tax equity of the qualified residence interest deduction would be greatly increased, and the tax cost of
the interest deduction would be greatly decreased, if the indebtedness limitations were reduced and/or the type of indebtedness was limited only to acquisition indebtedness.292 Another option would be to retain the current indebtedness
limitations but limit the amount of the interest deduction to a percentage of the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.293 With regard to the long-standing tradition
of allowing an interest deduction for indebtedness secured by a second home,
the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center offered a rough estimate that repealing the
deduction for second homes could generate $8 billion in tax revenues annually.294 With the Service’s acquiescence to the Voss decision, the tax equity of the
qualified residence interest deduction would be greatly increased, and the tax
cost of the interest deduction would be greatly decreased, if Congress legislated
that the indebtedness limitations apply on a per-residence basis.295
D. Replace the Current Deduction with a Credit
Several proposals have been advanced to replace the qualified residence interest deduction with a tax credit.296 The current deduction provides a proportionally larger tax benefit to upper-income taxpayers since they tend to buy
more expensive homes and are subject to higher marginal tax rates.297 Also, the
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fact that taxpayers must itemize their deductions before taking advantage of the
qualified residence interest deduction also limits the number of taxpayers who
can take advantage of this tax preference.298 A credit, unlike a deduction, has
the same dollar-for-dollar value to taxpayers regardless of their income level.299
Making the credit refundable would make this tax preference better targeted to
lower-income homeowners.300 Substituting a tax credit for the qualified residence interest deduction would provide a dollar-for-dollar tax benefit for all
taxpayers and be of greater benefit to lower-income homeowners.
Five of the most prominent tax credit options are summarized as follows:
Over the years, several mortgage interest tax credit options have been proposed. . . . All five would limit the deduction to a taxpayer’s principal residence.
Four out of the five would allow a 15% credit rate. Three of the five credit options would be nonrefundable. Two of the options would limit the size of the
mortgage eligible for the credit to $500,000, while one would limit eligible
mortgages to no greater than $300,000 (with an inflation adjustment). Another
would limit the maximum eligible mortgage to 125% of the area median home
prices. And still another would place no cap on the maximum eligible mortgage,
but would limit the maximum tax credit one could claim to $25,000.301

CONCLUSION
The questions of social and economic policy raised by I.R.C. section
163(h)(3) will continue to generate discussion and scholarship. The issues addressed in Sophy and Voss, the application of the qualified residence interest
deduction and the level of judicial deference given the varied pronouncements
by the Service, will undoubtedly be subject to litigation and legislation in the
future. Complicating the evaluation of the statute are concerns regarding the
fairness of a tax incentive given to homeownership, the even greater tax benefit
to wealthy taxpayers, the dramatic geographic disparity in the cost of homeownership, the proliferation of the marriage penalty, and the disparate treatment
of married and unmarried cohabitants. The acquiescence of the Service to the
Voss decision, applying the indebtedness limitations on a per-taxpayer basis,
has assured a greater tax preference to higher-income taxpayers and unmarried,
co-owners of residences. This seemingly simple statute has required a very deliberate analysis of its language, congressional intent, and policy implications,
and a methodical application of almost the entire inventory of the rules of statutory interpretation.
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